In conclusion, we hold you to a keen “interest-hit financing,” since the outlined within the Roentgen

In conclusion, we hold you to a keen “interest-hit financing,” since the outlined within the Roentgen

<¶>The court of appeals’ supposition concerning the legislative intention behind the STLA, emphasized here by amici in support of appellee, cannot override the unambiguous statutory language of R.C. (A). Indeed, the legislature, not the courts, should resolve any incongruity between the legislature’s intent and the statutory language enacted. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 32 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 512 N.E.2d 332 (1987). The question is not what the General Assembly intended to enact but the meaning of that which online Brewster payday loans it did enact. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004–Ohio–969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 12, quoting Slingluff, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, at paragraph two of the syllabus.

<¶> As we have previously noted, legislative inaction in the face of knowledge of longstanding statutory interpretation may suggest a legislative intent to retain existing law. Maitland v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ohio St.3d 463, 2004–Ohio–5717, 816 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 26. Here, the General Assembly’s acquiescence to the status quo contradicts the court of appeals’ determination that the General Assembly intended the STLA to be the exclusive legislation governing the type of short-term, single-installment loans at issue here.

<¶>It is not the role of the courts to establish legislative policy or to second-guess policy choices the General Assembly makes. Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010–Ohio–1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 61. If the General Assembly intended to preclude payday-style lending of any type except according to the requirements of the STLA, our determination that the legislation enacted in 2008 did not accomplish that intent will permit the General Assembly to make necessary amendments to accomplish that goal now. But the position that amici in support of appellee urge upon this court is fraught with legislative policy decisions, and to adopt that position would exceed the bounds of this court’s authority.

Once the used in that it disclosure, the fresh new Apr has not only focus but furthermore the most other funds fees associated with the mortgage

<¶>C. (F), may include a loan requiring repayment in a single installment. Lenders registered under the MLA may make single-installment, interest-bearing loans, and the STLA does not limit the authority of lenders registered under the MLA to make any loans authorized by the MLA. The unambiguous language of the MLA, consistent with the reasonable administrative construction of R.C. (F), compels the conclusion that appellant’s loan to appellee was an interest-bearing loan as defined under the MLA.

<¶>As a final matter, we note that we do not decide whether the loan described in the customer agreement complies in all respects with the MLA, but only whether appellant, as an MLA registrant, was entitled to make MLA-compliant loans unaffected by the STLA. For example, we do not decide whether the customer agreement’s requirement of interest at 25 percent per annum, pursuant to R.C. , was permitted by the MLA, or whether the 21–percent–interest cap in R.C. (A) applies. The court of appeals did not address that issue, and appellant’s propositions of law do not implicate it here.

<¶>For all these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

When you look at the more five years just like the enactment of your STLA, the entire Set up has never taken one step so you’re able to prevent new practice of pay check-design credit beneath the most other lending acts in effect prior to the fresh STLA

<¶>The MLA does not restrict the amount that can be lent or the duration of the loan. R.C. (A) provides that notwithstanding any other provisions of the Revised Code, an MLA lender may charge interest not exceeding 21 percent per year on the unpaid principal balance, but R.C. authorizes an interest rate not exceeding 25 percent per year “[a]s an alternative” to the rate permitted by R.C. (A).

<¶>On , appellant and appellee executed a customer agreement for a single-installment, $500 loan “governed by the laws of the State of Ohio, including the Mortgage Loan Act.” The customer agreement established the following payment schedule: “One payment in the amount of $ due on (Payment Date).” The payment amount included a $10 credit-investigation fee and a $30 loan-origination fee. Appellee agreed to repay the principal amount “plus interest at a rate of 25% per annum on the principal outstanding for the time outstanding from the date of this Customer Agreement until paid in full.” Had appellee repaid the loan on time, he would have paid $5.16 in interest. The federal truth-in-lending disclosure in the customer agreement informed appellee that the APR (“[t]he Cost of your credit as a yearly rate”) of his loan was percent. Smith v. Anderson, 801 F.2d 661, 663 (4th Cir.1986), citing 15 U.S.C. 1605–1606. The customer agreement permitted appellee to prepay his loan without penalty and thereby reduce the amount of interest he would owe. It also offered appellee the option of an extended payment plan.

<¶>Our paramount concern in construing a statute is legislative intent. State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004–Ohio–4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21. To discern legislative intent, we first consider the statutory language, reading all words and phrases in context and in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage. Id.; R.C. 1.42. We read and understand statutes “ ‘ “according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions.” ‘ ” Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm., 83 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 699 N.E.2d 473 (1998), quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 627, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), quoting McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 593, 1854 WL 6033, at *5 (1854).

<¶>The second question we must decide is whether the STLA prohibits MLA registrants from making payday-style loans even if those loans are otherwise permissible under the MLA. This issue arises because, despite its determination that the MLA does not apply to single-installment loans, the court of appeals’ majority went on to hold that the General Assembly intended, by its repeal of the Check–Cashing Lender Law and its enactment of the STLA, to prohibit any two-week loan. 2012–Ohio–5566, at ¶ 12. The majority reasoned that allowing MLA registrants to make two-week, single-installment loans would “nullify the very legislation that is designed to regulate payday-type loans.” Id. at ¶ 11.

Comments are closed.